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Zusammenfassung 
In aktuellen neuropsychologischen Konzepten wird Aufmerksamkeit in verschiedene 
Funktionsbereiche eingeteilt (Fernandez-Duque & Posner, 2001; Posner & Boies, 1971; 
Posner & Rafal, 1987; Sturm, 2005; van Zomeren & Brouwer, 1994). Eine dieser 
Teilfunktionen, “geteilte Aufmerksamkeit”, beschreibt die Fähigkeit, zwei oder mehr 
Aufgabenstellungen zur gleichen Zeit zu bearbeiten. 
Nach Wickens´ (1984) multipler Resourcen Theorie ist es schwieriger, zwei gleichzeitig 
präsentierte Aufgaben zu lösen, welche in der gleichen sensorischen Modalität (unimodal) 
dargeboten werden, im Vergleich zu Aufgaben, welche in verschiedenen sensorischen 
Modalitäten (bimodal) dargeboten werden. Darüberhinaus konnten in verschiedenen 
experimentellen Studien altersbedingte Unterschiede bei der Durchführung von geteilten 
Aufmerksamkeitsaufgaben festgestellt werden (Brouwer et al., 1991; Levitt et al., 2006; 
Ponds et al., 1988; McDowd & Craik, 1988; Somberg & Salthouse, 1982; Coburn et al., 
2006). Je älter die Probanden waren, umso stärker waren die festgestellten 
Beeinträchtigungen.  
Moderne funktionelle Bildgebungsverfahren, wie die funktionelle Magnet-
resonanztomographie (fMRT), ermöglichen es Hirnstrukturen zu bestimmen, welche für 
die Verarbeitung von bekannten psychologischen Prozessen und Effekten verantwortlich 
sind.  
Die vorliegende Dissertation beschreibt zwei verschiedene fMRT-Experimente, welche 
sich mit der Ausführung von geteilten Aufmerksamkeitsaufgaben beschäftigen. 
Beim ersten Experiment lag das Interesse in der Unterscheidung von kortikalen 
Repräsentationen während der Durchführung von unimodalen und bimodalen geteilten 
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Aufmerksamkeitsaufgaben. 16 gesunde männliche Rechtshänder im Alter zwischen 21 
und 30 Jahren bearbeiteten sowohl zwei unimodale (auditiv/auditiv, visuell/visuell) und 
eine bimodale geteilte Aufmerksamkeitsaufgabe, sowie dazugehörige selektive 
Aufmerksamkeitsaufgaben, welche als Kontrollbedingungen fungierten. Nach Abzug der 
entsprechenden Kontrollbedingungen waren für jede der drei geteilten Aufmerksam-
keitsaufgaben, unabhängig von der dargebotenen sensorischen Modalität, signifikante 
Aktivierungen in rechtshemisphärischen Arealen zu beobachten. Zu diesem Netzwerk 
gehörten der präfrontale Kortex, der inferior parietale Kortex und das Claustrum. Die 
bimodale Aufgabe verursachte stärker ausgeprägte frontale und parietale Aktivierungen, 
sowie rechtshemisphärische Aktivierungen des anterioren Cingulums und des Thalamus. 
Im Vergleich zu den unimodalen Aufgaben waren in der bimodalen Bedingung 
zusätzliche bilaterale frontale und linksseitige inferior parietale Aktivierungen zu 
beobachten. Die beschriebenen zusätzlichen Aktivierungen in der  auditiv/visuellen 
Bedingung sind vermutlich Auswirkungen der stärkeren Anforderungen, welche durch die 
Koordination der beiden gleichzeitig stattfindenden, kognitiven Prozesse in 
unterschiedlichen sensorischen Modalitäten verursacht wurden. 
Das zweite fMRT-Experiment befasste sich mit der Bestimmung von altersspezifischen 
kortikalen Aktivierungsunterschieden während der Durchführung von unimodalen und 
bimodalen geteilten Aufmerksamkeitsaufgaben. Eine junge (21-30 Jahre) und eine ältere 
Gruppe (51-74 Jahre) mit jeweils 16 gesunden männlichen Rechtshändern sollte, ähnlich 
wie im ersten Experiment, eine bimodale und zwei unimodale Aufgaben bearbeiten. 
Während der Durchführung der bimodalen Aufgabe zeigten sich im Vergleich zur 
jüngeren Gruppe stärkere bilaterale Aktivierungen im inferioren und medialen frontalen 
Kortex, im Cingulum und im inferioren parietalen Kortex, sowie eine linkshemisphärische 
Aktivierung des Claustrums. Die stärkere Aktivierung des inferior parietalen Kortex in der 
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älteren Probandengruppe war ebenfalls in den beiden unimodalen Bedingungen zu 
beobachten, so dass diese Struktur eine wichtige Rolle in der Bearbeitung von geteilten 
Aufmerksamkeitsaufgaben bei älteren Erwachsenen zu spielen scheint; und dies ist 
unabhängig davon, in welcher sensorischen Modalität die Stimuli dargeboten werden. Es 
wird postuliert, dass die beschriebenen stärkeren Aktivierungen der älteren Gruppe 
kompensatorischer Natur sind und durch die stärkeren Anforderungen, die zur 
Regulierung des Aufmerksamkeitssystems benötigt werden, zu erklären sind. Andererseits 
zeigte die jüngere Gruppe lediglich zusätzliche Aktivierung in der bimodalen Bedingung. 
Die dort nachgewiesene Thalamus-Aktivierung könnte durch eine stärker automatisierte 
Verarbeitung von geteilten Aufmerksamkeitsaufgaben zu erklären sein. 
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Summary 
In modern neuropsychology attention is subdivided into different domains (Fernandez-
Duque & Posner, 2001; Posner & Boies, 1971; Posner & Rafal, 1987; Sturm, 2005; van 
Zomeren & Brouwer, 1994). One of these domains is divided attention, which describes 
the ability to process two or more different tasks at the same time.   
According to Wickens´ (1984) multiple resources theory, processing two tasks 
simultaneously presented in the same sensory modality (within-modal) is more difficult 
than processing two tasks presented in two different sensory modalities (cross-modal). 
Furthermore, many experimental studies demonstrated age-related differences in different 
divided attention tasks (Brouwer et al., 1991; Levitt et al., 2006; Ponds et al., 1988; 
McDowd & Craik, 1988; Somberg & Salthouse, 1982; Coburn et al., 2006). Compared 
with young adults, older adults showed a significantly decreased ability to divide 
attention. 
Modern functional imaging techniques such as functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) provide the opportunity to identify brain structures which are linked to known 
psychological processes and effects. 
This thesis describes two different fMRI-experiments dealing with the execution of 
divided attention tasks.  
In the first experiment, we were interested in distinguishing the cortical representations of 
within-modal and cross-modal divided attention tasks. Sixteen healthy male subjects aged 
between 21 and 30 years underwent two within-modal (auditory/auditory, visual/visual) 
and one cross-modal (auditory/visual) divided attention task, as well as related selective 
attention control conditions. After subtraction of the corresponding control tasks the three 
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divided attention tasks, irrespective of sensory modality, revealed significant activation in 
a right hemisphere network involving the prefrontal cortex, the inferior parietal cortex and 
the claustrum. Under the cross-modal condition, however, the frontal and parietal 
activation was more extended and more bilateral and there was also stronger right 
hemisphere activation of the anterior cingulate gyrus and the thalamus. In comparison to 
the within-modal conditions additional bilateral frontal and left inferior parietal activation 
was found for the cross-modal one. The supplementary fronto-parietal, anterior cingulate 
gyrus and thalamus activation in the auditory/visual condition could be argued to reflect 
an additional demand for coordination of two ongoing cross-modal cognitive processes. 
In the second fMRI-experiment, we were interested in detecting aging effects possibly 
causing age-related differences in cortical representations of within-modal and cross-
modal divided attention tasks. A young group (aged 21 to 39 years) and an old group 
(aged 51 to 74 years) each comprising sixteen healthy male subjects underwent one cross-
modal (auditory/visual) and two within-modal (auditory/auditory; visual/visual) divided 
attention tasks like in the first experiment. During the cross-modal task, the old group 
revealed stronger divided attention specific bilateral activation in inferior and middle 
frontal areas, in the cingulate gyrus and in the inferior parietal lobule as well as in the left 
claustrum than the young group. In the old group the right inferior parietal lobule was also 
stronger activated while performing the two within-modal tasks, indicating that in older 
people this specific brain structure is highly involved in divided attention irrespective of 
sensory modality. We assume that the described additional activation in the old group 
reflects compensatory effects caused by the greater demand for attentional resources in 
order to regulate the system. On the other hand, the young group only showed additional 
activation in the thalamus during the cross-modal task. This might represent a more 
bottom-up organized processing of divided attention tasks. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 What is attention? 
„Everyone knows what attention is.” Thus began William James´ definition of attention in 
his book „Principles of Psychology‟ more than 100 years ago (James, 1890). Nowadays it 
is unlikely that anyone would precede an attempt to define attention as James did, because 
of the numerous research paradigms, concepts and models, where this term is used in the 
context of different psychological functions. James continued his attempt for a definition, 
“It is the taking possession by the mind, in clear and vivid form, of one out of what seems 
several simultaneously possible objects or trains of thought. Focalization, concentration, 
of consciousness are of its essence. It implies withdrawal from some things in order to 
deal better with others.” His definition emphasizes the selectivity aspect but also involves 
intensity, perception and cognition. 
According to present psychological and neuropsychological theories, attention cannot be 
regarded as a unitary function. Established neuropsychological attention taxonomies 
(Fernandez-Duque & Posner, 2001; Posner & Boies, 1971; Posner & Rafal, 1987; Sturm, 
2005; van Zomeren & Brouwer, 1994) subdivide attention into two broad domains, one 
representing the intensity aspects “alertness and sustained attention”, and the other one the 
selection aspects “focused and divided attention”. While selective respectively focused 
attention has been studied extensively with modern neuroimaging techniques, there are 
only a few studies dealing with the most demanding function of the selection aspect, 
namely divided attention. 
To divide ones attention means that individuals are engaged in two or more different tasks 
at the same time. They have to divide attention between these tasks and allocate mental 
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resources to each of them. Wickens (1984), who is generally considered to have made 
important contributions to the field of divided attention, developed a multiple-resource 
model. He studied various combinations of types of tasks (e.g. verbal vs. nonverbal, visual 
vs. auditory, manual vs. vocal) and investigated interference. Wickens (1984, p.90) stated: 
“Two tasks with demands in close proximity within this functional space share resources – 
neural processing mechanisms – and will interfere with each´s performance. Where this 
space contains discontinuities (as between cerebral hemispheres or processing 
modalities), adoption of a multiple-resources conception becomes quite plausible.” This 
means that different types of task rely on different processing resources. Therefore, 
processing two tasks simultaneously might be more difficult if they take hold of the same 
pool of resources, raising the question of whether there are different attentional networks 
involved when attention is divided within one modality, as opposed to across two different 
information channels.  
Craik (1977) who investigated attentional age declines wrote that “one of the clearest 
results in the experimental psychology of aging is the finding that older subjects are more 
penalized when they must divide their attention, either between two input sources, input 
and holding, or holding and responding”. Although there are many behavioral studies 
(Brouwer et al., 1991; Levitt et al., 2006; Ponds et al., 1988; McDowd & Craik, 1988; Somberg & 
Salthouse, 1982) which emphasize Craik´s statement, there is only little knowledge about 
differences in neural activity regarding younger and elder people. 
In the introduction to this thesis, important psychological as well as modern 
neuropsychological theories and concepts are summarized. Furthermore, the attention 
domains based on Sturm´s (2007) taxonomy are described. Finally, relevant knowledge 
about functional neuroanatomy and age-related impairments of attention is summarized. 
The second part describes the first fMRI-study of this thesis concerned with the functional 
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network of divided attention in general as well as with neural activation differences during 
the performance of within-modal and cross-modal tasks. The third part of this thesis 
includes a second fMRI-study dealing with age-related differences in neural activity 
during the simultaneous processing of within-modal as well as cross-modal divided 
attention tasks. Finally, the last chapter of this thesis summarizes more general 
conclusions derived from the divided attention fMRI-experiments and sketches an outlook 
for further work. 
 
 
1.2  Theories and Concepts of Attention 
One of the first important contributions to modern attention research was Broadbent´s 
(1958) filter model, in which the selection aspect of attention is the focus. A basic 
assumption of this information processing approach is that the capacity to perform 
cognitive operations is generally limited. Broadbent assumed that only one relevant input 
stimulus can be processed by the cognitive system at a time. In order to enable the system 
to deal efficiently with the relevant signals and achieve an optimized interaction with the 
environment, he postulated a filter that excluded all irrelevant information on the basis of 
purely physical characteristics like color or localization. Only information passing the 
filter gets access to a higher conscious semantic processing, which means that this model 
principally excludes the parallel processing of more than one stimulus. According to 
Broadbent´s filter model, solving divided attention tasks is only possible by switching 
quickly between the attentional foci of two different ongoing tasks (van Zomeren & 
Brouwer, 1994).  
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Later theorists demonstrated experimentally that Broadbent´s model contradicts several 
empirical facts and cannot be upheld in its extreme form. First of all, Grey & Wedderburn 
(1960) showed that there is an early semantic processing because participants were able to 
follow messages which were presented to each ear in an alternating fashion. In another 
study (Treisman, 1960), participants were instructed to listen through a set of headphones 
to two different messages, one played to either ear and they were asked to focus on the 
information that is being played to one specific ear. After some time, the meaningful 
information in the attended ear changed into meaningless talk, while the information 
making sense was presented to the other ear, which should be ignored. Contrary to the 
instruction some participants reproduced the information presented in the “wrong” ear. 
Based on her empirical findings, Treisman developed attenuation theory, in which she 
postulated that selection takes place at a later stage than Broadbent had suggested. 
Treisman proposed that the unattended information is not filtered but attenuated. She 
contends that processing takes place in a hierarchical way, with processing of physical 
characteristics early in the hierarchy and semantic processing at a later stage. Processing 
of semantic information will only take place if there is sufficient processing capacity. If 
not, then some later analyses are omitted for unattended stimuli. Deutsch and Deutsch 
(1963) argued that selection takes place even later in processing than Treisman assumed 
(„... all sensory messages which impinge upon the organisms are perceptually analysed at 
the highest level“, Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963, in: Hoffmann, 1993, p. 78). Their theory 
postulated that all inputs are unfiltered, unattenuated and fully (even semantically) 
processed.  
The controversy about early or late selection continued in attention research for a long 
time until Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) presented a two-process model of information 
processing, which partly solved the problem of early versus late selection. The authors 
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distinguished between automatic and controlled/conscious processing of information. 
Automatic processing occurs in parallel and therefore the capacity of this mode of 
processing is almost unlimited. Controlled processing is thought to proceed in a serial way 
because of its strong interference with and from other demands, and because its efficiency 
is largely dependent on time-pressure. According to their model all information can reach 
the highest level of the cognitive system automatically without any conscious control, 
presumed that the elements of the appropriate processing sequences were sufficiently 
learned before and are available in long-term memory.  
An important assumption of the two-process model is that only controlled and conscious 
tasks require cognitive resources. This means that a well practiced processing sequence is 
executed almost automatically and one has to pay low attentional costs even if it is a very 
complex one. Thus, Shiffrin and Schneider´s theory makes it possible to “divide” attention 
and to process two tasks concurrently if they are both well practiced (van Zomeren & 
Brouwer, 1994). Furthermore, the authors differentiate between two kinds of attentional 
problems: focused attention deficits and divided attention deficits. 
A focused attention deficit appears when a response produced by automatic processing 
interferes with a response produced by controlled processing. For example, when driving 
a new car where the positions of windshield wiper and turn indicator controls are located 
opposite to their positions in the previous vehicle, the windshield wipers will often be 
turned on accidentally. It does not always come to an actual turning on of the wipers, but 
the tendency is experienced and may only be overcome by more controlled processing. 
A divided attention deficit results from the limited capacity of the system for controlled 
serial processing. If too much task-relevant information is presented too quickly, the 
system can no longer cope with all information. 
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Another line of theorizing, which is important to the understanding of selective and 
divided attention processes in particular, is represented by capacity theories of attention. 
These theories have their origin in experiments studying tasks that are executed 
simultaneously and they postulate that psychological processes require separate 
processing resources, which are limited. Wickens (1984) one of the most prominent 
capacity theorist stated: “The concept of processing resources is proposed as a 
hypothetical intervening variable to account for variations in the efficiency with which 
time-sharing can be carried out; that is the degree to which two tasks can be performed 
concurrently as well as each can be performed in isolation.” Contrary to previously 
described theories, Wickens assumes that there are multiple resources which can be 
allocated in order to deal with different tasks simultaneously (see Fig.1). Coping with two 
tasks at the same time generally produces interference. Wickens postulates that the degree 
of interference is largely dependent on the extent to which the two tasks occupy the same 
sensory modalities (e.g. auditory vs. visual), involve the same processing stages 
(encoding, processing, responding), and require the same memory codes (spatial vs. 
verbal) or kinds of responses (manual vs. vocal) (see Fig.1). This means that two tasks 
which are presented in the same sensory modality are more difficult than two tasks which 
are processed in different information channels. The capacity models have often been 
criticized to be based on circular reasoning. Identification of resources and their limited 
availability is mainly derived from the patterns of interference between various tasks and 
interference is explained by the limited availability of resources. 
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Fig. 1: The multiple-resource model proposed by Wickens. Each box in figure 1 indicates one 
cognitive resource. Depending on the nature of the task, these resources may have to process 
information sequentially if the different tasks require the same pool of resources, or can be 
processed in parallel if the task requires different resources. (From Wickens, 1984) 
 
The Cognitive Schema Theory developed by Norman and Shallice (1986) also makes 
assumptions about the simultaneous processing of multiple tasks by advancing the terms 
“automatic” and “controlled/conscious” processing, introduced by Shiffrin and Schneider 
(1977). In particular, Shallice (1982) addressed the question of whether there is control 
over automatisms like in automatic information processing and automatic responding. In 
this context some studies showed that practicing dual-tasks enhanced performance and 
conclusively led to more automated processing (Kerns & Mateer, 1996; Spelke et al., 
1976). Norman and Shallice (1986) therefore distinguished between two adaptive 
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mechanisms to regulate the system: contention scheduling and supervisory attentional 
control.  
Contention scheduling is an automatic conflict resolution process that selects one of the 
interfering schemata according to environmental cues and priorities and gives it 
precedence at any given moment. When one schema is selected and active it is postulated 
to bias the sensitivity to trigger other schemata by lateral inhibition of incompatible 
schemata and facilitation of compatible schemata. This process reduces the probability of 
incompatible schemata leading to incorrect behaviors. Simultaneously, subsequent 
triggers may be anticipated, at least if they fit compatible schemata. The schemata have 
developed through experience and are represented by associative links between their 
representations in long-term memory. 
Supervisory attentional control gets activated in non-routine situations and describes the 
process of controlled and therefore conscious regulation of attention that is not biased by 
long-term memory but instead by the strategy active in working memory. In the 
terminology of Cave & Wolfe (Cave & Wolfe, 1990; Wolfe et al., 1989) this mechanism 
may be viewed as voluntary, controlled, “top-down” modulation of the excitability of 
schemata whereas contention scheduling may be regarded as an automatic “bottom-up” 
process. Norman and Shallice postulate that supervisory attentional control cannot select 
schemata but operates indirectly by influencing the excitability of schemata. This 
assumption is a reasonable explanation for the Stroop-effect where it is possible for an 
unwanted schema (reading the word) to become active while the supervisory attentional 
control should activate a different task (i.e. naming the color of the letters).  
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1.3  Modern neuropsychological Theories and Concepts 
According to modern neuropsychological concepts, attention is not regarded as a unitary 
function. Recent theories postulate that attention can be subdivided into different 
components that interact with each other and with other psychological functions. 
Parasuraman (1998) stated: “Attention is not a single entity but the name given to a finite 
set of brain processes that can interact, mutually and with other brain processes, in the 
performance of different perceptual, cognitive, and motor tasks.” In this context, studies 
of cerebral injury revealed that lesions in specific networks may impair specific 
attentional functions. Especially the work of Posner and his group exerted great influence 
on the development of multidimensional attention concepts (Posner & Boies, 1971; 
Posner & Rafal, 1987; Posner & Petersen, 1990). The authors  proposed that the attention 
system can be divided into three subsystems: (a) orienting (orienting to sensory events), 
(b) detecting (detecting signals for focal conscious processing) , and (c) alerting 
(maintaining a vigilant or alert state)  (Posner & Petersen, 1990).  
Van Zomeren and Brouwer (1994) adopted Posner´s model and distinguished two key 
domains of attention: selectivity and intensity. These two domains can be characterized by 
means of the spotlight metaphor: as a spotlight, attention can be directed to a certain 
location (selectivity), and the light can be varied in intensity (very bright to very weak) as 
attention can be varied. Furthermore, the authors subdivided the selectivity aspect into 
“focused attention” and “divided attention”. The term “focused attention” describes tasks 
where attention has to be concentrated on one source or kind of information while others 
must be excluded. In “divided attention” tasks, attention is divided or shared between two 
or more information channels, or two or more mental operations. The intensity aspect is 
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represented by the components “alertness” and “sustained attention” which describe basic 
processes to maintain a certain level of attentional activation for a short or long time 
period. 
Sturm (2005; 2007) synthesized van Zomeren & Brouwer´s model and Posner´s 
assumptions by keeping the dimensions intensity and selectivity and adding spatial 
attention (orienting) as a separate entity. Moreover, the author suggested further 
differentiations of the intensity aspect by discriminating between intrinsic, tonic and 
phasic alertness as well as by delineating vigilance as compared to sustained attention. 
Finally, Sturm (2005) distinguished the formerly equivalent terms “focused attention” and 
“selective attention”. The attention domains based on Sturm´s (2007) taxonomy are 
described in detail in the next chapter (see also Fig. 2). 
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Fig. 2: Three different attention dimensions and their corresponding domains of  Sturm´s (2007) 
taxonomy of attention. (From Sturm, 2007) 
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1.4  Neuropsychological attention domains 
Alertness (intrinsic, tonic, phasic) 
Alertness is the ability to control arousal and response readiness. Tonic alertness describes 
the variability and changes in arousal at different times of the day, while phasic alertness 
marks the rapid mobilization of resources to process an expected stimulus if a warning 
stimulus precedes. On the other hand, the level of alertness can be modulated by intrinsic 
cognitive control even in the absence of external cues. Therefore, Sturm et al. (1999) 
introduced the term “intrinsic alertness” which represents the internal (cognitive) control 
of wakefulness and arousal. Alertness is neuropsychologically tested by simple reaction 
time tasks without (intrinsic and tonic alertness) or with a warning stimulus (phasic 
alertness), as e.g. the Alertness task included in the computerized test battery “Test for 
Attentional Performance” (TAP) developed by Zimmermann & Fimm (1997).  
 
Sustained Attention / Vigilance 
Sustained attention tasks require attention to be directed to one or more sources of 
information over long and generally uninterrupted periods of time for the purpose of 
detecting and responding to small changes in the information presented. Sturm (2005) 
discriminates between sustained attention and vigilance by assigning long-time tasks with 
a high stimulus rate to sustained attention and long-time tasks with a low stimulus rate to 
vigilance. Therefore, vigilance delineates the process of paying close and continuous 
attention in very monotonous (boring) situations like driving a car on the high-way at 
night, controlling an assembly line or surveying the display in a control center.  
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Visual-spatial attention 
Posner & Rafal (1987) distinguished covert attention shifts from overt attention shifts and 
introduced them as a special case of selective attention. Posner and colleagues showed in 
several experiments that shifting attention between two objects is not dependent on eye-
movements but that covert attention shift precedes the eye-movements (Posner & 
Petersen, 1990). The authors demonstrated that shifting visual-spatial attention can be 
subdivided into three processes: (a) “disengage” the current attentional focus; (b) “shift” 
the focus and (c) “engage” it on a new target stimulus. Interestingly, all processes are 
linked to specific neural structures (see chapter 1.5).  
 
Selective attention / Focused attention 
Selective or focused attention describes the ability to focus attention on specific parts of a 
task while irrelevant stimuli have to be ignored. 
Selective attention increases the responsiveness to specific stimuli by giving them a higher 
priority in further processing. Typical selective attention tasks are the go/nogo tasks in the 
test battery TAP (Zimmermann & Fimm, 1997) where subjects have to respond 
selectively to a predefined set of stimuli but not to others. 
A special case of attentional selectivity is focused attention and describes the process of 
isolating a certain fragment of the environment in order to analyze it. It is important to 
maintain the focus and to suppress interference due to simultaneous and automatic 
processing even if there are many distractors (Sturm, 2007).  
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Divided attention 
Divided attention describes the ability to respond simultaneously to two (or more) 
different tasks or multiple task demands.  Attention has to be divided between these tasks 
and mental resources have to be allocated to each of them. Divided attention is 
neuropsychologically tested by dual-tasks which examine attentional capacity limits 
(Kahnemann, 1973; Posner & Boies, 1971; Treisman, 1969). The better parts of the tasks 
have been learned (which means that information processing is more automated) the less 
attentional capacity is needed. The ability to shift the focus of attention and to move it 
between different tasks having different cognitive requirements is called “mental 
flexibility” or “alternating attention”.  
 
 
1.5  Functional Neuroanatomy 
Contemporary neuropsychological views of attention favor its implementation in 
widespread networks comprising numerous cortical and subcortical structures. There is a 
close interaction between attentional structures among each other as well as between these 
structures and brain regions highly relevant to other cognitive functions. 
In this context Posner and Petersen state: “It [the attentional system] interacts with other 
parts of the brain, but maintains its own identity. […], attention is carried out by a 
network of anatomical areas. It is neither the property of a single center, nor a general 
function of the brain operating as a whole. […], the areas involved in attention carry out 
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different functions, and these specific computations can be specified in cognitive terms” 
(Posner & Petersen, 1990). 
The specific attention domains are represented by specific neural structures or networks 
and many studies have shown that specific attentional functions can be impaired 
selectively by focal brain damage (Kerns & Mateer, 1996). Some of these brain regions 
are important for more than just one attentional function. Furthermore, authors propose 
that particular cognitive functions are represented by multiple neural structures (e.g. 
Zimmermann & Fimm, 1997). 
In the following, neuropsychological knowledge about attentional functions and their 
neural correlates is summarized, subdivided according to intensity and selection aspects of 
attention as well as additional sections dealing with spatial attention and goal-directed 
(top-down) and stimulus-driven (bottom-up) attentional processing.  
 
Neural correlates of the intensity aspect of attention 
Numerous studies have shown that besides the formatio reticularis of the brainstem 
(Mesulam, 1985), especially the right hemisphere plays a predominant role in modulating 
the intensity aspect of attention. Lesion studies in stroke patients report a dramatic 
increase in simple visual and auditory response time subsequent to right-hemisphere 
lesions (Howes & Boller, 1975; Ladavas, 1987; Posner et al., 1987).  
Posner et al. (1987) as well as Tartaglione (1986) demonstrated that right-hemisphere 
patients do benefit from a warning stimulus, which means that only the intrinsic aspect of 
alertness is impaired while phasic alertness seems to be largely unaffected.  
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Studies using lateralized stimulus presentation in healthy subjects (Dimond & Beaumont, 
1973; Heilman & Van den Abell, 1979; Sturm et al., 1989) as well as in split-brain 
patients (Dimond, 1979) emphasized the assumption that the right hemisphere plays a 
dominant role in maintaining and controlling intensity aspects of attention. According to 
Posner and Petersen (1990), there is a right hemisphere noradrenergic alerting network 
comprising the locus coeruleus (Fig. 3) as the origin of the noradrenergic system (Aston-
Jones et al., 1984) as well as frontal structures, which send activation to the parietal 
cortex.  
 
Fig. 3: Location of the locus coeruleus in the formatio reticularis (from Trepel, 2006, 
modified) 
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From lesion studies in rats there is evidence for a right hemisphere bias in the 
noradrenergic system (Robinson, 1979; Robinson & Coyle, 1980; Robinson, 1985) 
originating in the locus coeruleus and basically projecting to frontal areas. These studies 
corroborate the assumption that the noradrenergic activation is top-down regulated by the 
right prefrontal cortex, since lesions in this area led to significant decrease of 
noradrenergic activation in both hemispheres as well as in the locus coeruleus. In a PET 
study investigating the effects of clonidine -an adrenergic α2-adrenoceptor agonist- on the 
activation during a rapid visual information processing task, the authors found an increase 
of the modulating effects of the anterior cingulate cortex (Fig. 4) on projections from the 
locus coeruleus to the parietal cortex (Coull et al., 1997). On the other hand, the authors 
found a decrease of activation in the right thalamus and bilaterally in the inferior parietal 
and superior frontal cortex (Fig. 5). In this context, Fernandez-Duque and Posner (1997) 
hypothesized that the alerting network co-activates (either directly or via the brainstem) 
the posterior attention system in the parietal cortex which is involved in spatial orienting 
of attention (Posner and Petersen, 1990). In two PET-activation studies dealing with 
visual respectively auditory intrinsic alertness tasks, Sturm and co-workers (1999; 2004) 
found relevant activation comprising a complex network including the right anterior 
cingulate cortex, the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the right inferior parietal lobule 
as well as thalamic and brainstem structures (ponto-mesencephalic tegmentum, probably 
including the locus coeruleus). Furthermore, the authors hypothesized that right 
hemisphere frontal brain structures exert top-down control via thalamic nuclei by 
activating noradrenergic structures in the ponto-mesencephalic part of the brainstem. In a 
further analysis, the authors stressed that the anterior cingulate functions as the central 
coordinating structure for the right hemispheric neural network of intrinsic alertness and 
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that the anterior cingulate gyrus is modulated mainly by the prefrontal and the parietal 
cortex (Mottaghy et al., 2006).  
 
Fig. 4: Medial surface of the anterior cingulate gyrus (from Trepel, 1999, modified) 
 
Fig. 5: Lateral surface of the dorsolateral frontal cortex and inferior parietal cortex (from Trepel, 
1999, modified) 
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Paus et al. (1997) demonstrated that a similar network as described for intrinsic alertness 
tasks was also responsible for an auditory vigilance task, where the subjects had to 
maintain the attentional level for 60 minutes. The authors reported an increase in response 
time and of theta-activity in the EEG over time which correlated with activation decreases 
of the thalamus, the right ventrolateral and dorsolateral frontal cortex, the parietal and the 
temporal cortex. Activation of the thalamus correlated with activation of the right ponto-
mesencephalic tegmentum, the anterior cingulate and the substantia innominata. Finally, 
Pardo et al. (1991) and Lewin et al. (1996) investigated visual respectively somatosensory 
sustained attention tasks and identified a right hemisphere fronto-parietal network. 
 
Neural correlates of spatial attention 
As mentioned before, Posner & Petersen (1990) distinguished three processes for shifting 
visual-spatial attention: “disengage”; “shift”, and “engage” (see chapter 1.4). Damage to 
the posterior parietal lobe has its greatest effect on the ability to disengage from an 
attentional focus to a target located in a direction opposite to the side of the lesion (Posner 
et al., 1984). Patients with a lesion in the superior colliculus and/or surrounding areas also 
show a deficit in the ability to shift attention. Finally, patients with lesions of the thalamus 
and monkeys with chemical injections into the lateral pulvinar show difficulty in engaging 
attention on a target on the side opposite to the lesion. 
In a PET-study, Corbetta (1993) investigated shifts of visuo-spatial attention during 
lateralized detection tasks. The authors reported bilateral activation of the superior parietal 
and frontal cortex. Interestingly, the right superior parietal cortex was activated more 
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strongly than its left homologue during responses to the left and right field. These results 
were also corroborated by later studies (Corbetta et al., 1995; Nobre et al., 1997). In a 
review, Corbetta et al. (1998) reported that the neural basis of covert visual orienting 
largely overlaps with overt orienting (saccadic) brain structures, which means that the 
attentional processes during covert visual orienting are tightly linked to oculomotor 
processes. On the other hand, Spence & Driver (2004) demonstrated cross-modal 
congruency-effects of spatial attention by investigating responses to visual, auditory, and 
tactile stimuli.  
In a recent fMRI-study, Bartolomeo et al. (2007) instructed participants to perform a 
visual target detection task with peripheral cues. In the first part of the experiment, cues 
were not predictive of the side of occurrence of the incoming target, while in the second 
part of the paradigm cues became 80% predictive. Half of the participants were 
subsequently aware of the altered cue-target relationship, while the other half of the 
participants did not recognize any differences in the second half of the experiment. Both 
groups showed fronto-parietal activity that is typical for spatial attentional processing. The 
authors suggested that the additional anterior cingulate cortex activation in the aware-
group is due to the role of this structure in purposeful behavior and in the monitoring of 
consequences. 
 
Neural correlates of the selection aspect of attention 
Similar to Sturm et al. (1999; 2004) assumptions about the neural network responsible for 
the intensity aspect of attention, Stuss and Benson (1986) as well as Guillery (1998) 
suggested a fronto-thalamic gating system for the control of selective attention. The 
authors hypothesize top-down control of the frontal cortex on the reticular nucleus of the 
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thalamus, which, dependent on the information coming from frontal structures, selectively 
opens specific thalamic gates for activation originating from the mesencephalic reticular 
formation.  Patients with lesions in parts of this network show impairments of the ability 
to select external stimuli and demonstrate increased distractibility.  
While intrinsic alertness and sustained attention tasks are represented in a more right 
lateralized network, several studies showed that selective and focused attention is 
predominantly subserved by the left hemisphere. For example Dee & van Allen (1973) 
investigated patients with left and right hemisphere lesions and reported choice reaction 
deficits in speed and accuracy only for the left lesion group. Bisiach (1982) investigated 
healthy subjects´ response times to lateral visual stimuli in crossed as well as uncrossed 
conditions and emphasized the location of decisional structures in the left hemisphere. 
 Regarding visual attention, one can put emphasis on the overall picture (global form) or 
the focal details of a scene (local components). In this context, several studies have 
indicated that the left hemisphere is biased towards local (e.g. focus attention tasks) and 
the right towards global processing (Fink et al., 1996; Robertson & Lamb, 1991; Sergent, 
1982). Furthermore, Fink et al. (1996) indicated that fronto-parietal structures were 
activated, when subjects had to switch between global and local stimuli. 
In a PET-study Corbetta et al. (1990; 1991) investigated subjects who had to discriminate 
between shape, color and speed of a visual stimulus in selective attention as well as 
divided attention tasks. Selective conditions activated globus pallidus, caudate nucleus, 
left lateral orbitofrontal cortex, posterior thalamus/colliculus, and insular-premotor 
regions, while the divided condition activated the anterior cingulate and dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex. For a detailed description of the studies dealing with the neural 
structures responsible for divided attention tasks see chapters 2 and 3. 
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Neural correlates of goal-directed (top-down) vs. stimulus-driven (bottom-up) 
processing 
Corbetta & Shulman (2002) discriminate between two different neural networks which are 
responsible for different attentional processings. One network, which carries out goal-
directed (“top-down”) selection for stimuli and responses, includes parts of the 
intraparietal cortex and superior frontal cortex. The other network, which comprises the 
temporoparietal cortex and inferior frontal cortex -largely lateralized to the right 
hemisphere- is responsible for stimulus-driven (“bottom-up”) processing of stimuli.  
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1.6  Attention and Aging 
In the course of aging (especially 70yrs and older) many cognitive and mnestic functions 
show impairments, although there is considerable interindividual variability (Salthouse, 
2000; McDowd & Shaw, 2000). Age-related changes in attention have been cited as the 
basis for a variety of age-related behavioral inefficiencies. The goal of this section is to 
review psychological findings related to attentional age differences subdivided according 
to the domains sustained attention, selective attention, and divided attention. 
 
Sustained attention / Vigilance 
There are only a few studies concerned with age differences in vigilance task 
performance, and those relevant studies show little evidence for age-related impairments 
in performance across time (Giambra, 1993).  In a study by Mouloua & Parasuraman 
(1998), the authors varied the event rate (low, high) and manipulated the target location 
certainty (low, moderate, high) in a sustained attention task requiring target identification 
across 30 minutes. They found that task performance declined across time at a faster rate 
for old adults than for young adults when event rate was high and target location certainty 
was low. These results suggest that sustained attention performance does change with age, 
at least when demands on visual attention are strong. In the sense of Sturm´s (2005, 2007) 
differentiation between vigilance and sustained attention tasks this means that the 
(stimulus-rich) sustained attention tasks are affected more strongly by aging than the 
(boring) vigilance tasks. Furthermore some authors found evidence for the physical fitness 
level affecting sustained attention tasks, particularly for older adults (Bunce et al., 1993; 
Bunce et al., 1996).  
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Selective attention 
There are inconsistent reports regarding age-related differences in focused and selective 
attention tasks. In studies utilizing typical (visual search) focused attention tasks several 
authors showed that older adults were more negatively affected by the presence of 
distracting information than young adults (Connelly et al., 1991; Earles et al., 1997). 
Other theorists demonstrated that the age-related distraction effect was reduced by prior 
knowledge about target location (Carlson et al., 1995; Plude & Hoyer, 1985; Wright & 
Elias, 1979). Further visual search studies revealed that older adults are slower than young 
adults in allocating attention (Madden, 1992) and distractor homogeneity facilitates 
performance more for young adults than for old adults (Madden et al., 1996). 
Studies using the Stroop-task (see chapter 1.2) revealed that older adults show greater 
susceptibility to interference than younger adults (Cohn et al., 1984; Comalli et al., 1962; 
Dulaney & Rogers, 1994; Hartley, 1993). Other authors reported aging effects for the 
performance in negative priming tasks (Kieley & Hartley, 1997; McDaniel et al., 2003; 
McDowd & Filion, 1995; McDowd, 1997). On the other hand, Verhaeghen & Cerella 
(2002) reviewed several meta-analyses examining age-related differences in selective 
attention and divided attention. The authors found no age-related deficits specific to 
Stroop-tasks or negative-priming tasks, while declines are reported regarding the 
performance in divided attention tasks. 
 
Divided attention 
Kramer & Larish (1996) stated that “one of the best exemplars of a mental activity in 
which large and robust age-related differences have been consistently obtained is dual-
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task processing” (p.83). Most of the authors corroborate Kramer & Larish´s (1996) 
statement and report aging effects in many different dual-task experiments (Brouwer et 
al., 1991; Levitt et al., 2006; Ponds et al., 1988; McDowd & Craik, 1988; Somberg & 
Salthouse, 1982; Coburn et al., 2006). On the other hand, Hahn and Cramer (1995) found 
no differences between a young and an old group who had to divide attention between two 
separate locations in visual space. These data suggest that the ability to divide attention 
varies with stimulus parameters.  
The difficulty in trying to synthesize the findings on age-related differences in divided 
attention tasks lies in the fact that each study typically involves a specific combination of 
tasks that participants have to perform simultaneously. Nevertheless, most studies have in 
common that they are concerned with the question of whether attentional variables or 
simple slowing can best account for age differences in divided attention tasks. In this 
context, Hartley (1992) concluded that “-the process involved in doing two things 
concurrently are probably qualitatively quite similar in younger and older adults. The 
differences are caused by the fact that each of the component processes is affected by 
aging” (p.32). On the other hand, Salthouse (1995) as well as Kramer & Larish (1996) 
emphasized that although slowing in single-task performance can account for most of the 
variance observed in dual tasks, it cannot account for all of it. Tsang and Shaner (1998) 
made a stronger assumption in favor of task specific factors. The authors investigated a 
group of pilots and non-pilots (aged 20-79 years), and made a systematic attempt to 
identify factors relevant to age-related impairments in dual-task performance. They 
examined the role of age and expertise in divided attention performance in the context of 
Wickens´ (1984) multiple resources model of structure-specific dual-task performance 
(see chapter 1.2). In a series of six sessions, the participants performed a vertical-axis 
tracking task, an easy and difficult spatial orientation task; and two Sternberg tasks, one 
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requiring a manual response and one requiring a vocal response. Each task was performed 
individually and in combination with a horizontal-axis tracking task. The authors found 
that the factors age, expertise, and structural similarity affected time-sharing performance 
through attentional resources. Tsang and Shaner (1998) conclude from their data that there 
is an age-related decline in divided attention abilities beyond that observed for the 
separate tasks performed on their own. Furthermore, the authors suggested that earlier 
assumptions indicating that the adequate control of allocation strategies and single-task 
performance levels would eliminate an age-related dual-task performance deficit 
(Somberg & Salthouse, 1982) may have been based on relatively easier tasks. Finally the 
authors found that, although expertise did not eliminate age-related performance 
decrements, it did reduce the dual-task decrement. In this context, Kramer et al. (1995) 
reported that training can improve divided-attention performance for older people as well 
as for younger adults, although the age difference in performance could not be eliminated  
by training. Finally, Hawkins (1992) showed that aerobic fitness is an important factor in 
determining the presence or absence of divided attention performance. For a review of 
studies concerned with age-related differences in neural activity during the performance of 
divided attention tasks see chapter 3.1. 
Finally, several authors investigated tasks, where the participants had to switch attention 
between separate tasks and found age-relevant impairments (Hawkins et al., 1992; Kramer 
et al., 1999). Increasing component task demands tended to increase age declines in 
performance. 
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2.  Study 1: Management of attentional resources in within-modal and cross-modal 
divided attention tasks; an fMRI study
1
. 
 
2.1  Introduction 
In everyday life, the ability to divide attention is indispensable since we attend 
concurrently to a multitude of different inputs either occurring in the same (within-modal) 
or in different (cross-modal) sensory modalities (e.g. visual and auditory stimuli). Divided 
attention means that individuals are engaged in two or more different tasks at the same 
time, they have to divide attention between these tasks and allocate mental resources to 
each of them. Norman and Shallice (1986) postulated that the coordination of two 
interfering tasks is controlled by the “Supervisory Attentional System” which they 
assumed to have its neural correlate in frontal structures. Animal experiments (Goldman-
Rakic, 1987) and craniocerebral injury studies (McDowell et al., 1997; van Zomeren & 
van den Burg, 1985) as well as studies of patients with a rupture of an aneurysm of the 
anterior a. communicans (Rousseaux et al., 1996) actually showed that carrying out 
divided attention tasks is indeed largely dependent on frontal structures. Duncan (1997) 
distinguished between within- and cross-modal divided attention tasks and found a more 
restricted attentional capacity within but not between sensory modalities, raising the 
question of whether there are different attentional networks. Unfortunately, functional 
imaging studies dealing with divided attention until now have concentrated either on 
within-modal or on cross-modal dual tasks but have not compared the two with each other 
(for a review see Coull, 1998; Mesulam, 1999). Furthermore, the activated brain regions 
                                                            
1 Vohn, R., Fimm, B., Weber, J., Schnitker, R., Thron, A., Spijkers, W., Willmes, K., Sturm, W.  (2007). 
Management of attentional resources in within-modal and cross-modal divided attention tasks: An fMRI study. 
Hum.Brain Mapp.. 
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found in the within-modal as well as in the cross-modal studies are inconsistent, probably 
due to the different stimulus material and/or types of tasks. 
One of the groups concerned only with within-modal stimuli (Madden et al., 1997), 
investigated differences in visual selective and divided attention tasks in a PET study. 
Age-unrelated brain activation for dividing attention was found in occipitotemporal, 
occipitoparietal and bilateral prefrontal regions. Besides a right prefrontal involvement, 
activation of the anterior cingulate gyrus was found in another PET study (Corbetta et al., 
1991) dealing with within-modal divided attention, where subjects had to differentiate 
between shape, colour and speed of a visual stimulus. In a functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) study on working memory (Bunge et al., 2000) participants performed 
two tasks (sentence reading and short-term memory for five words) either separately or 
concurrently. Also in this study, within-modal dual-task performance showed stronger 
activation in bilateral prefrontal areas compared to either task performed alone, but no 
area was activated beyond the single-tasks´ regions. In another within-modal fMRI study 
(Koechlin et al., 1999), the posterior dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the lateral parietal 
cortex were activated bilaterally during a visual dual-task where the participants had to 
differentiate between upper- and lower-case letters.  
Among the authors studying cross-modal tasks, Johannsen et al. (1997) investigated 
sustained and divided attention in normal elderly humans with visual and vibrotactile 
stimuli. Under the divided attention condition, the PET data revealed right hemisphere 
activation in inferior parietal and prefrontal regions and thalamic activation in the left 
hemisphere. In an fMRI study by Szameitat et al. (2002), the analysis of the dual-
task/single-task subtraction revealed that cortical areas along the inferior frontal sulcus, 
the middle frontal gyrus and the intraparietal sulcus were involved in cross-modal dual-
task performance. Subjects were given both auditory and visual three-choice response 
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tasks performed either separately as single tasks or concurrently as a dual-task, for which 
an increased difficulty level led to stronger bilateral activation in the regions described. In 
another fMRI study, Loose et al. (2003) assessed cross-modal (visual/auditory) divided 
attention and selective attention tasks in healthy male subjects. In comparison to the 
selective attention conditions, the divided attention paradigm evoked additional left 
prefrontal activation, which the authors suggested to be crucial in the execution of 
controlled processing when attention is divided between two sources of cross-modal 
information. 
While several of these findings seem highly relevant and interesting, no clear activation 
pattern can be extracted for either the within-modal or the cross-modal experiments, which 
led us to our study trying to differentiate between networks involved in within-modal and 
cross-modal divided attention tasks. 
According to Wickens´ Multiple Resources Theory (1984), different types of tasks (e.g. 
verbal vs. nonverbal, visual vs. auditory, manual vs. vocal) rely on different processing 
resources. Therefore, processing two tasks simultaneously might be more difficult if they 
take hold of the same pool of resources. Furthermore, one can draw the conclusion that 
processing two tasks presented simultaneously in the same sensory modality (e.g. two 
visual tasks) should call for higher top-down control and thus for stronger frontal 
activation than two tasks presented in different modalities and tapping their individual 
resources.  
The purpose of this fMRI study was to distinguish the differences in cortical 
representations of within-modal (auditory/auditory; visual/visual) and cross-modal 
(auditory/visual) divided attention tasks and to analyze the management of attentional 
resources. If the comparison of the tasks would reveal stronger frontal activation for the 
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within-modal conditions this would be in line with Wickens´ multiple resources model.  
On the other hand, authors of task switching studies prefer the hypothesis that switching 
between two sensory modalities has higher demands on cognitive flexibility than 
switching within one modality (Adcock et al., 2000; Dove et al., 2000). Thus, the results 
of our cross-modal condition could corroborate either Wickens´ or the “task switchers” 
hypothesis.  
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2.2 Methods 
 
Subjects 
Sixteen male healthy right-handed subjects, mean age 25.2 yrs (range 21-30 years), 
participated in the study. No subject had a history of psychiatric or neurological disorder 
nor a history of head trauma. All subjects gave written consent according to the 
declaration of Helsinki. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the 
University Hospital of Aachen and by federal authorities.  
 
Experimental design and procedure 
The participants underwent an fMRI study consisting of three divided attention conditions 
(DAC) and four selective attention control conditions (SAC) presented in randomized 
order (see Fig. 6). The DACs consisted of two within-modal (auditory/auditory, 
visual/visual) and one cross-modal task (auditory/visual). In the auditory/auditory DAC, 
subjects listened to high pitched (1500 Hz) and low pitched (200 Hz) tones presented in 
alternating order (SOA 1500ms, stimulus duration 1000 ms). 36% of the tones changed 
their pitch after 500 ms presentation time either from 1500 Hz to 750 Hz or from 200 Hz 
to 400 Hz. Participants had to respond if they heard a consecutive sequence (probability 
50%) of two descending high pitched or two ascending low pitched tones. In the second 
within-modal DAC (visual/visual), circles and squares were presented in alternating order 
(SOA 1500ms, stimulus duration 1000 ms). 36% of the objects changed their dimension 
after 500 ms presentation time. The subjects had to respond if they saw two increasing 
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circles or two decreasing squares in sequential order. In the cross-modal auditory/visual 
DAC, squares and low pitched tones were presented alternately (SOA 1500ms, stimulus 
duration 1000 ms). In 36% of the presented stimuli, the size of the squares decreased or 
the low pitched tones raised their pitch. Participants had to respond if they saw two 
decreasing squares or if they heard two ascending low pitched tones in sequential order. 
Due to the fact that under the auditory/auditory DAC the two different auditory stimuli 
could not be presented simultaneously, we had to choose a fast alternating presentation of 
the stimuli under all conditions in order to keep the tasks comparable. The task 
nevertheless is a divided attention task, because the information in both “channels” has to 
be kept in working memory and continuously updated in order to make the decision 
whether there were two consecutive changes (1-back condition) in either of the two 
sequences. Thus, the experiment utilizes a real “dual task paradigm” taken to be essential 
for divided attention setups. A high level of supervisory attentional control sensu Norman 
and Shallice (1986) respectively a high level of central executive control in working 
memory (Baddeley, 1993) is necessary to cope with our tasks. 
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Fig.6: Schematic examples of the three divided attention (DAC) and four selective attention 
conditions (SAC).  The “finger on the button” shows where the participants had to respond. 
 
The selective attention tasks differed from the divided attention tasks just by the 
instructions given to the participants. Thus, changes in brain activity were caused only by 
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a different attentional state and not by physical variations of the stimuli. During the 
performance of the auditory/auditory SAC, participants had to attend only to the high 
pitched tones and ignore the low pitched ones. In the visual/visual SAC subjects had to 
observe only the circles and ignore the squares.  Finally, the auditory/visual SAC is a 
compound of two sessions. In the first session (SAC1) the volunteers had to attend to the 
visual stimuli while ignoring the auditory ones and in the other session (SAC2) vice versa. 
One must point out that the subjects in the SAC had to press the response button half as 
frequently as under the DAC, with the risk of motor activation being stronger in the DAC. 
In the rest periods of all sessions, participants had to keep their eyes open whilst watching 
a black screen. To familiarize the subjects with the task, the experiment was explained and 
practised outside the scanner. Auditory stimuli were presented via fMRI suitable 
headphones (Commander XG, Resonance Technologies Inc., Los Angeles, USA) and 
visual stimuli were presented via MR-compatible LCD goggles (VisuaStim XGA, 
Resonance Technology Inc., Los Angeles, USA). The subjects responded via a right-hand 
thumb key press. Each of the seven sessions was embedded into a typical box-car design 
with six periods of rest-activation alternations (rest period 27.9 s, 9 scans each; activation 
period 46.5 s, 15 scans each). 
 
Image acquisition 
All measurements were conducted using a whole body Philips Gyroscan NT 1.5 Tesla 
MRI (Philips Medical Systems, Nederland B.V.) with a standard head coil. After orienting 
the axial slices in the anterior-posterior commisure (AC-PC), plane functional images 
were acquired using a T2*-weighted echo planar imaging (EPI) sequence with a repetition 
time (TR) of 3100 ms, an echo time (TE) of 50 ms and a flip angle (FA) of 90 degrees. In 
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total 1008 volumes were collected, consisting of 34 contiguous slices with a thickness of 
3.5 mm measured with whole brain coverage. A 64x64 matrix with a field of view (FOV) 
of 220 mm was used yielding an effective voxel size of 3.4375 x 3.4375 x 3.5 mm. Head 
motion was minimized by using Velcro straps and foam padding.  
 
Image analysis 
Functional images were pre-processed and statistically analysed using SPM2 (Wellcome 
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK). Images were realigned in order to 
correct for motion. Translation and rotation correction did not exceed 2 mm and 1,7° 
respectively for any of the participants. Images were spatially normalized into the 
anatomical space of the MNI brain template (Montreal Neurologic Institute) in order to 
accommodate intersubject variation in brain anatomy and to allow pixel-by-pixel 
averaging across subjects with a voxel size of 4 x 4 x 4 mm in the x, y and z dimensions. 
These functional images were smoothed using a Gaussian filter of 8 x 8 x 8 mm to 
increase signal-to-noise ratio in the images. Random effects statistical analysis was 
performed at an intensity threshold of p=0.001 uncorrected for all complex contrasts with 
an extent threshold of k=5 voxels and all contrasts being inclusively masked by the 
minuend with p=0.001 uncorrected in order to eliminate deactivations of the subtrahend 
becoming significant due to the subtraction (see results). Finally, coordinates of 
activations were transformed from MNI to Talairach space (Talairach and Tournoux, 
1988) using the matlab function mni2tal.m implemented by Matthew Brett 
(http://www.mrc-cbu.cam.ac.uk/Imaging/mnispace.html). 
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2.3 Results 
Behavioural data 
The mean accuracy level of performance in the auditory/auditory DAC as well as in the 
auditory/visual DAC was 95.7%, in the visual/visual DAC 96.5%. Numerically even 
higher levels were achieved for the selective attention conditions with a rate of 98.4% 
correct answers in the auditory/auditory SAC and the auditory/visual SAC 2 as well as 
99.2% in the visual/visual SAC resp. 99.6% in the auditory/visual SAC 1 (see Fig.7). The 
seven tasks, however, were compared by paired t-tests and showed no significant 
differences for the level of accuracy (p> 0.05). 
 
Fig.7: Mean % correct responses and their standard deviations (SD) in the three divided attention 
conditions auditory/auditory DAC, visual/visual DAC, auditory/visual DAC and the four selective 
attention conditions auditory/auditory SAC, visual/visual SAC, auditory/visual SAC1 (responses 
only to visual stimuli) as well as auditory/visual SAC2 (responses only to auditory stimuli). 
46 
 
fMRI:  
All DAC´s were contrasted with their adjacent control tasks (SAC´s) in order to 
discriminate structures that respond stronger to divided attention tasks. The mean image of 
the contrasts “auditory/auditory DAC vs. auditory/auditory SAC” and “visual/visual DAC 
vs. visual/visual SAC” (see Fig. 8, Table 1) displays typical activation of within-modal 
divided attention tasks (“within-modal DAC-SAC”), irrespective of sensory modality. 
This contrast revealed right hemisphere only activation in the precentral gyrus, the middle 
frontal gyrus, the claustrum and the inferior parietal lobule. On the other hand, the cross-
modal contrast “auditory/visual DAC vs. auditory/visual SAC” showed significant 
bilateral activation in the middle and superior frontal gyrus, the inferior and superior 
parietal lobule, as well as right hemisphere activation in the inferior frontal gyrus, the 
cingulate gyrus, claustrum, the precentral gyrus, insula, thalamus, the lateral globus 
pallidus and finally left superior temporal gyrus activation (see Fig. 8, Table 2). In 
contrast, subtracting the DACs from their related SACs left no significant activation at all.  
Furthermore, a conjunction analysis of the presented within- and cross-modal DAC vs. 
SAC contrasts revealed a right hemisphere activation network consisting of the precentral 
gyrus, the superior frontal gyrus, the claustrum as well as the inferior and superior parietal 
lobule (see Fig. 8, Table 3). Finally, the subtraction of the mean within-modal activations 
(“within-modal DAC-SAC”) from the cross-modal ones (“cross-modal DAC-SAC”) left 
activation in the right middle frontal gyrus, the left superior, medial and middle frontal 
gyrus as well as the left inferior parietal lobule (see Fig. 8, Table 4). The reversed contrast 
left no significant activation at all. 
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Fig.8: Functional activation map of the divided attention (DAC) minus selective attention (SAC) 
contrasts. Group-averaged t-maps (P<0.001, uncorrected, inclusively masked by the minuend, 
mask: P<0.001 uncorrected) for the contrasts:  
within-modal (DAC-SAC): mean of the contrasts auditory/auditory (DAC-SAC) and visual/visual 
(DAC-SAC); cross-modal (DAC-SAC): auditory/visual (DAC-SAC); conjunction (cross-modal 
DAC-SAC; within-modal DAC-SAC): conjunction of the contrasts auditory/auditory (DAC-SAC), 
visual/visual (DAC-SAC) and auditory/visual (DAC-SAC); (cross-modal DAC-SAC) – (within-
modal DAC-SAC): auditory/visual (DAC-SAC) contrasted by the mean of auditory/auditory (DAC-
SAC) and visual/visual (DAC-SAC). The contrast (within-modal DAC-SAC) – (cross-modal DAC-
SAC) left no significant activation. 
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Table 1 
Mean significant differences in brain regions during the within-modal divided attention tasks 
auditory/auditory and visual/visual compared to the adjacent auditory and visual selective 
attention control-conditions (p<0.001 uncorrected; k=5). 
 
within-modal : DAC– SAC 
Brain region 
    Talraich coordinates 
x y z z-value voxels 
R precentral gyrus (BA 9) 44 21 39 3.43 35 
R middle frontal gyrus (BA 9) 44 32 28 3.15  
R middle frontal gyrus (BA 10) 36 36 24 3.09  
R inferior parietal lobule (BA 40) 36 -52 39 3.28 22 
R claustrum 32 12 3 3.11 5 
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Table 2 
Significant differences in brain regions during the cross-modal divided attention task compared to 
the mean of the two adjacent selective attention control-conditions (p<0.001 uncorrected; k=5) 
 
cross-modal: DAC– SAC 
Brain region 
    Talraich coordinates 
x y z z-value voxels 
R claustrum 32 8 -4 4.73 67 
R precentral gyrus (BA 44) 55 8 11 3.82  
R insula (BA 13) 44 12 3 3.78  
R inferior frontal gyrus (BA 47) 36 27 -8 3.31  
R middle frontal gyrus (BA 9/10/46) 28 32 24 4.58 38 
R superior frontal gyrus (BA 10) 36 51 20 3.29  
L frontal lobe (sub-gyral) (BA 6) -24 -1 55 4.52 45 
L superior frontal gyrus (BA 6) -20 7 62 4.13  
R inferior parietal lobule (BA 40) 36 -52 43 4.52 101 
R superior parietal lobule (BA 40) 36 -52 50 4.22  
R thalamus 4 -11 19 4.38 54 
R lentiform nucleus (lateral globus pallidus) 24 -15 4 3.63  
R middle frontal gyrus (BA 6) 24 14 55 4.27 58 
R superior frontal gyrus (BA 6) 20 3 66 3.37  
L superior parietal lobule (BA 7) -16 -63 51 4.27 65 
L inferior parietal lobule (BA 40) -44 -44 46 4.06  
R cingulate gyrus (BA 32) 12 22 43 4.07 6 
L superior temporal gyrus (BA 22) -48 -4 -3 3.75 8 
L middle frontal gyrus (BA 9/46) -40 33 35 3.69 20 
R middle frontal gyrus (BA 8/9) 44 21 28 3.48 17 
50 
 
 
Table 3 
Brain regions identified by the conjunction analysis of the two within-modal contrasts 
„auditory/auditory DAC-SAC‟ and „visual/visual DAC-SAC‟ and the cross-modal contrast 
„auditory/visual DAC-SAC‟ (p<0.001 uncorrected; k=0). 
 
Conjunction {cross-modal DAC-SAC; within-modal DAC-SAC} 
Brain region 
    Talraich coordinates 
x y z z-value voxels 
R precentral gyrus (BA 9) 44 21 39 3.38 11 
R inferior parietal lobule (BA 40) 40 -52 50 3.10 5 
R superior parietal lobule (BA 7) 32 -56 51 3.95  
R claustrum 32 12 3 3.02 2 
R superior frontal gyrus (BA 9) 36 36 28 2.96 1 
 
Table 4 
Significant differences in brain regions during the cross-modal divided attention task 
„auditory/visual DAC-SAC‟ compared to the within-modal divided attention tasks 
„auditory/auditory DAC-SAC‟ and „visual/visual DAC-SAC‟ (p<0.001 uncorrected; k=5). 
 
(cross-modal DAC– SAC) – (within-modal DAC-SAC) 
Brain region 
    Talraich coordinates 
x y z z-value voxels 
L superior frontal gyrus (BA 9) 0 7 55 4.19 15 
L medial frontal gyrus (BA 8) -4 18 47 3.40  
R middle frontal gyrus (BA 9) 32 36 24 3.68 7 
L inferior parietal lobule (BA 40) -48 -44 54 3.46 9 
L middle frontal gyrus (BA 46) -44 40 16 3.34 12 
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2.4 Discussion 
 
In the present study we wanted to distinguish the cortical representations of within-modal 
(auditory/auditory; visual/visual) vs. cross-modal (auditory/visual) divided attention 
conditions (DAC) by fMRI.  
The three DACs did not differ behaviourally with respect to the accuracy of performance 
(95.7% - 96.5%), which means that Wickens´ behavioural predictions concerning within-
modal tasks being more difficult than cross-modal tasks could not be confirmed by the 
behavioural data of our experiment. This finding may be due to a rather low overall 
difficulty level of the three DACs, although all participants subjectively rated the 
auditory/visual task being easier than either of the within-modal conditions.  
After subtraction of the related selective attention control conditions (SAC), all DAC´s 
revealed significant activation in the right prefrontal cortex, in the right inferior and 
superior parietal cortex and in the right claustrum. The fronto-parietal activations seem to 
be characteristic for divided attention tasks and for most other kinds of executive 
attentional processing irrespective of sensory modality (Pessoa et al., 2003), whereas the 
claustrum is considered to be involved especially in cross-modal processing (Calvert, 
2001; Ettlinger & Wilson, 1990; Hadjikhani & Roland, 1998). Crick and Koch (2005) see 
an analogy for the role of the claustrum as a conductor coordinating a group of players in 
an orchestra. Although the claustrum displays the global maximum of activation in our 
cross-modal DAC, it is also significantly activated in the within-modal DAC´s which 
brings us to the assumption that the claustrum conducts also “different players with the 
52 
 
same instruments”. In other words, the claustrum plays an important role in coordinating 
two tasks simultaneously irrespective if they are presented in the same or in two different 
sensory modalities.  
According to Wickens´ multiple resources theory, performing two tasks simultaneously in 
the same sensory modality should be more difficult than cross-modal dual tasks. 
Therefore, one might assume that simultaneous execution of two tasks which are 
presented in the same sensory modality should call for a higher top-down control than a 
dual task with cross-modal shifting. Thus, under the within-modal conditions a stronger 
frontal activation might be hypothesized than under the cross-modal condition. The results 
however, revealed exactly the opposite pattern: the DAC vs. SAC contrasts showed a 
much more extended frontal activation for the cross-modal condition. Contrasted with the 
within-modal DACs, the cross-modal DAC led to additional activation in the middle 
frontal gyrus bilaterally as well as to left hemisphere medial and superior frontal and 
inferior parietal activation. One plausible explanation of these results might be that the 
supplementary fronto-parietal activations in the cross-modal DAC possibly reflect the 
greater demand for sensory coordination of two ongoing cross-modal cognitive processes. 
This is in accordance with the results of the cross-modal divided attention study of Loose 
et al. (2003). 
Furthermore, we demonstrated enhanced right hemisphere anterior cingulate activation in 
the cross-modal DAC. The cingulate gyrus is known to play an important role in 
attentional processing (Posner and Rothbart, 1998) and in more recent attentional 
taxonomies it is proposed to be the most central part of an “executive attention” network 
(Fernandez-Duque et al., 2000; Fernandez-Duque and Posner, 2001). Banati et al. (2000) 
as well as Laurienti et al. (2003) showed that the anterior cingulate cortex is especially 
involved in executing cross-modal tasks. Although many studies report increased activity 
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of the cingulate cortex as a result of increased task difficulty (Banati et al., 2000; Buckner 
et al., 1996; Klingberg & Roland, 1997), the comparable level of accuracy of our three 
DACs makes it more probable that the cingulate cortex activation in the auditory/visual 
condition of our experiment is caused by the cross-modal character of the task and not by 
a general increase of difficulty level under this condition. Furthermore, the cross-modal 
DAC significantly activated right hemisphere thalamic structures, which are known to 
correlate with activations of the anterior cingulate cortex (Paus et al., 1997; Sturm et al., 
2004; Mottaghy et al., 2006) in attention tasks. The thalamus is considered to operate as a 
gating system between the anterior cingulate, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the 
inferior parietal cortex and the noradrenergic brain stem part of the reticular activation 
system (Guillery et al., 1998; Steriade et al., 1986; Sturm et al., 1999; Stuss and Benson, 
1986; Yingling and Skinner, 1975). The increased activation of the anterior cingulate 
gyrus and the thalamus in the cross-modal DAC thus reflects the higher demands on the 
gating system when the concurrent supply of activation needed for simultaneous 
processing of two tasks in different sensory modalities has to be controlled.  
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2.5 Conclusion 
All three DACs lead to activations in the right prefrontal cortex, in the right inferior and 
superior parietal cortex as well as in the right claustrum. These areas might delineate the 
common network involved in distributing or dividing attention between two different tasks 
irrespective of sensory modality. In line with recent cross-modal divided attention studies, 
there were additional bilateral middle and superior frontal activations in the cross-modal 
rather than in the within-modal DACs reflecting the greater demand for coordination of 
attentional resources for tasks performed simultaneously in two sensory modalities and 
thus a higher need for top-down processing of attention (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002). 
This notion is corroborated by the right hemisphere anterior cingulate cortex and thalamus 
activations in the cross-modal auditory/visual DAC, reflecting the higher demand for 
controlling activation under this condition. 
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3. Study 2: “Age-related differences of Neural Activity during Within-Modal and 
Cross-Modal Divided Attention Tasks: an fMRI Study” 
3.1 Introduction 
There are many functional imaging studies dealing with age-related differences during a 
variety of cognitive or perceptual tasks and most of them focus on memory functions 
(Persson & Nyberg, 2006; Dennis et al., 2006; Fernandes et al., 2006; van, V et al., 2006; 
Zarahn et al., 2007). One interesting cognitive domain which has been almost neglected in 
the past is divided attention although the results of pure behavioral studies (Brouwer et al., 
1991; Levitt et al., 2006; Ponds et al., 1988; McDowd & Craik, 1988; Somberg & 
Salthouse, 1982) showed that older people have difficulties dealing with these tasks in 
comparison to  younger age cohorts. One group which was actually interested in aging 
effects (Madden et al., 1997), compared 12 young (age 21-28 years) with 12 old adults 
(age 60-77 years) during selective and divided visual attention tasks. In the comparison 
“divided attention versus selective attention”, the older group showed relatively greater 
activation in bilateral prefrontal regions and the younger adults revealed stronger 
activation in the occipitotemporal pathway. Although the authors´ divided attention 
condition rather resembles a focused attention one, it was definitely more difficult than the 
selective attention task; so one can draw the conclusion that older adults compensate 
higher difficulty level by stronger prefrontal brain activation while the younger group 
seems to solve the task with an up-regulation of the sensory cortex involved in the tasks. 
In a PET-study Johannsen et al. (1997) investigated sustained and divided attention in 
normal elderly humans (age 51-73 years) with visual and vibrotactile stimuli. The divided 
attention condition revealed right hemisphere activation in inferior parietal and prefrontal 
regions as well as thalamic activation in the left hemisphere. Unfortunately, the authors 
did not compare the interesting results with a younger age group. Besides the already 
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mentioned small number of imaging studies discussing aging effects of divided attention, 
another problem becomes obvious even when  the somewhat larger number of studies is 
included observing only one cohort: The authors utilized different sensory modalities and 
concentrated either on within-modal or on cross-modal dual tasks and therefore found 
inconsistent results concerning the activated brain regions.  
One of the groups dealing only with within-modal divided attention tasks (Corbetta et al., 
1991), where subjects (aged 22-41) had to differentiate between shape, color and speed of 
a visual stimulus in a PET - study, found activation in the right prefrontal cortex and in the 
anterior cingulate. In an fMRI study focusing on working memory  eight participants 
(aged 18-28)  performed two tasks (sentence reading and short-term memory for five 
words) either separately or concurrently(Bunge et al., 2000). Again, in this study the 
within-modal dual task performance showed stronger activation in bilateral prefrontal 
areas when compared with either task performed alone. In another fMRI-study  the 
participants (aged 26-37)  had  to process two simultaneously presented visual information 
streams during a focused and a divided attention condition (Nebel et al., 2005). In the 
within-modal “divided attention – focused attention” comparison the participants showed 
stronger activation in a widespread network including bilateral dorso- and ventrolateral 
structures, the superior and inferior parietal cortex as well as the right insula. Koechlin et 
al. (1999) found a similar activation pattern in an fMRI-experiment where the participants 
(aged 20-28) bilaterally activated the posterior dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the 
lateral parietal cortex during a visual dual-task in which upper and lowercase letters had to 
be differentiated. 
Among the authors concentrating on cross-modal tasks, Johnson et al. (2006) investigated 
selective and divided attention in young subjects (aged 20 – 33) with visual (viewing 
geometric shapes) and auditory (hearing novel melodies) stimuli and reported that the 
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divided attention task led to additional left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activation while 
the selective attention conditions did not recruit any additional frontal areas. In another 
fMRI study, Szameitat et al. (2002) subtracted a single-task from a dual one and found 
cross-modal dual-task activation in the cortical areas along the inferior frontal sulcus, the 
middle frontal sulcus and the intraparietal sulcus. Subjects (aged 21 – 27) were given both 
auditory and visual three-choice reaction tasks presented either separately as single tasks 
or concurrently as dual-tasks. Increased difficulty level led to stronger bilateral activation 
in the described regions. A further cross-modal fMRI study by Loose et al. (2003) 
investigated visual/auditory divided attention and selective attention tasks in young male 
subjects (aged 19 – 28). The divided attention / selective attention subtraction revealed 
additional left prefrontal activation, which the authors suggested to be crucial for the 
execution of controlled processing, when attention is divided between two sources of 
cross-modal input. 
In a previous fMRI-study, we differentiated between within-modal and cross-modal 
divided attention tasks and showed that both tasks irrespective of sensory modality lead to 
activation in the right prefrontal cortex, in the right inferior and superior parietal cortex as 
well as in the claustrum. Furthermore, the cross-modal condition lead to additional 
bilateral middle and superior frontal activities which we interpreted as a result of the 
higher demand for the coordination of attentional resources allocated for tasks performed 
simultaneously in two different sensory modalities (Vohn et al., 2007).   
In this fMRI – study we were interested in distinguishing the differences in brain 
activation of young and old age groups in within-modal as well as cross-modal divided 
attention tasks. We hypothesize that the old group compensates the higher effort by 
additional activation of the typical divided attention network with especially stronger 
frontal activations due to a higher need for top-down control. In contrast to earlier studies 
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we directly compare two cohorts of age groups both for within-modal and cross-modal 
tasks in one study. 
 
3.2 Methods 
Subjects 
Thirty-two male healthy right-handed subjects divided into a “young group” and an “old 
group” each of them consisting of 16 subjects participated in the study. The young 
subjects group had a mean age of 25.2 years (range 21-30 years) while the old subjects 
group had a mean age of 62.8years (range 51-74). No subject had a history of psychiatric 
or neurological disorder nor a history of head trauma. All subjects gave written consent 
according to the declaration of Helsinki. The study was approved by the ethics committee 
of the University Hospital of Aachen and by federal authorities. 
Experimental Design and Procedure 
All participants of both groups underwent an fMRI study with three divided attention 
conditions (DAC) presented in randomized order. The conditions consisted of one cross-
modal task (auditory/visual) and two within-modal tasks (auditory/auditory; visual/visual) 
(see Fig. 9). In the within-modal auditory/auditory DAC, subjects listened to high pitched 
(1500 Hz) and low pitched (200 Hz) tones presented in alternating order (SOA 1500 ms, 
stimulus duration 1000 ms). 36% of the tones changed their pitch after 500 ms 
presentation time either from 1500 Hz to 750 Hz or from 200 Hz to 400 Hz. Participants 
had to respond if they heard a consecutive sequence (probability 50%) of two descending 
high pitched or two ascending low pitched tones. In the second within-modal DAC 
visual/visual, circles and squares were presented in alternating order (SOA 1500 ms, 
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stimulus duration 1000 ms). 36% of the objects changed their dimension after 500 ms 
presentation time. The subjects had to respond if they saw two increasing circles or two 
decreasing squares in consecutive (?)sequential order. In the cross-modal auditory/visual 
DAC squares and low pitched tones were presented alternately (SOA 1500 ms, stimulus 
duration 1000 ms). In 36% of the presented stimuli, the size of the squares decreased or 
the low pitched tones raised their pitch. Participants had to respond if they saw two 
decreasing squares or if they heard two ascending low pitched tones in sequential order. 
Due to the fact that under the auditory/auditory DAC the two different auditory stimuli 
could not be presented simultaneously, we had to choose a fast alternating presentation of 
the stimuli under all conditions in order to keep the tasks comparable. The task 
nevertheless is a divided attention one, because the information in both “channels” has to 
be kept in working memory and continuously updated in order to make the decision 
whether there were two consecutive changes (1-back condition) in either of the two 
sequences. Thus, the experiment utilizes a real “dual task paradigm” esteemed to be 
essential for divided attention setups. A high level of supervisory attentional control sensu 
Shallice (1994) respectively a high level of central executive control in working memory 
(Baddeley, 1993) is necessary to cope with our tasks. 
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Fig 9. Schematic examples of the three divided attention conditions (DAC). The “finger on the 
button” shows where participants had to respond. 
 
In the rest periods of all sessions, participants had to keep their eyes open whilst watching 
a black screen. To familiarize the subjects with the task, the experiment was explained and 
practised outside the scanner. Auditory stimuli were presented by fMRI suitable 
headphones (Commander XG, Resonance Technologies Inc., Los Angeles, USA) and 
visual stimuli were presented by MR-compatible LCD goggles (VisuaStim XGA, 
Resonance Technology Inc., Los Angeles, USA). The subjects responded via a right-hand 
thumb key press. Each of the three sessions was embedded into a typical box-car design 
with six periods of rest-activation alternations (rest period 27.9 s, 9 scans each; activation 
period 46.5 s, 15 scans each). 
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Image acquisition 
All measurements were conducted using a whole body Philips Gyroscan NT 1.5 Tesla 
MRI (Philips Medical Systems, Nederland B.V.) with a standard head coil. After orienting 
the axial slices in the anterior-posterior commissure (AC-PC) plane, functional images 
were acquired using a T2*-weighted echo planar imaging (EPI) sequence with a repetition 
time (TR) of 3100 ms, an echo time (TE) of 50 ms and a flip angle (FA) of 90 degrees. In 
total 1008 volumes were collected, consisting of 34 contiguous slices with a thickness of 
3.5 mm measured with whole brain coverage. A 64x64 matrix with a field of view (FOV) 
of 220 mm was used yielding in an effective voxel size of 3.4375 x 3.4375 x 3.5 mm. 
Head motion was minimized by using Velcro straps and foam padding.  
 
Image analysis 
Functional images were pre-processed and statistically analysed using SPM2 (Wellcome 
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK). Images were realigned in order to 
correct for motion. Translation and rotation correction did not exceed 2.7 mm and 1.9° 
respectively for any of the participants. Afterwards images were spatially normalized into 
the anatomical space of the MNI brain template (Montreal Neurologic Institute) in order to 
accommodate intersubject variation in brain anatomy and to allow pixel-by-pixel 
averaging across subjects with a voxel size of 4 x 4 x 4 mm in the x, y and z dimensions. 
These functional images were smoothed using a Gaussian filter of 8 x 8 x 8 mm to 
increase signal-to-noise ratio in the images. 2-sample t-Test analysis was performed at an 
intensity threshold of p<0.01 for all contrasts with an extent threshold of k=10 contiguous 
voxels. A Monte Carlo simulation with 1000 simulations (Slotnick et al., 2003; Slotnick & 
Schacter, 2004) of our brain volume demonstrated that this cluster extent cut-off provided 
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an experiment-wise threshold of p < 0.05, corrected for multiple comparisons. Finally, 
coordinates of activations were transformed from MNI to Talairach space (Talairach & 
Tournoux, 1988) using the matlab function mni2tal.m implemented by Matthew Brett 
(http://www.mrc-cbu.cam.ac.uk/Imaging/mnispace.html). 
 
 
 
 
3.3 Results 
Behavioural data 
The accuracy level of both groups was very high in all three sessions (see Fig. 10). In the 
auditory/auditory condition the younger group achieved a mean accuracy level of 95.7% 
whereas the old group was numerically less accurate by reaching 93.4%. In the 
visual/visual divided attention task both groups reached a rate of 96.5% correct answers. 
Finally, the old group was numerically better in the auditory/visual session with 98.8% 
correct answers compared to the young group obtaining 95.7%. Performance in the three 
tasks, was compared between the groups by a two-sample t-test as well as within the 
groups by a paired t-test and revealed no significant differences for the level of accuracy 
(P>0.05). 
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Fig. 10: Mean % correct responses and their standard deviations (SD) of both the young and the 
old group in the three divided attention conditions auditory/auditory, visual/visual and 
auditory/visual. 
 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
In order to compare activation of the two age groups for the two within-modal tasks 
irrespective of sensory modality, conjunction images of the auditory/auditory and the 
visual/visual conditions were created for both groups. In the within-modal group-
comparison the old group revealed significantly stronger activation in the left precentral 
gyrus as well as in the right pre- and postcentral gyrus, inferior parietal lobule and medial 
and superior frontal gyrus (see Fig. 11, right upper part; Table 7). The young group on the 
other hand showed no stronger activations for within-modal divided attention tasks in 
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comparison to the older one. The comparison of the cross-modal condition revealed a 
wide-spread network of stronger activation in the old group, bilaterally in the fusiform 
gyrus, the inferior parietal lobule, the cingulate gyrus and the precentral gyrus. Additional 
left hemisphere activation for the old group was observable in the inferior occipital gyrus, 
the inferior, superior and middle temporal gyrus, the precuneus, the claustrum, the 
postcentral gyrus and the middle frontal gyrus as well as thalamus and basal ganglia 
activation in the lentiform nuclei of the lateral globus pallidus and the putamen. Right 
hemisphere activation was stronger in the inferior frontal gyrus, the parahippocampal 
gyrus and in the paracentral lobule. Furthermore, there was stronger activation in the 
uncus and the subthalamic nucleus of the brainstem (see Fig. 11, left upper part; Table 5). 
In the cross-modal condition the young group showed stronger activation mainly in the 
right thalamus and in the left caudate body as well as in the right superior temporal gyrus 
and in the hippocampus (see Fig 11, left upper part; Table 6). Furthermore, a conjunction 
analysis of the group-comparisons across all divided attention conditions revealed stronger 
activation in the old group in the left precentral gyrus and in the right inferior parietal 
lobule whereas no stronger activation survived in the young group (see Fig. 11, lower part; 
Table 8). 
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Fig. 11: Functional activation map of the bidirectional divided attention group comparisons. The 
red/yellow voxels display stronger old group activation whereas the green/blue voxels show stronger 
young group activation. Two-sample t-maps (P < 0.05, corrected) for the contrasts: cross-modal 
divided attention: auditory/visual DAC; within-modal divided attention: mean of the contrasts 
auditory/auditory DAC and visual/visual DAC; conjunction {cross-modal; within-modal}: conjunction 
of the contrasts auditory/auditory DAC, visual/visual DAC and auditory/visual DAC. The within-
modal comparison as well as the conjunction left no significantly stronger activation for the young 
group. 
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TABLE 5. Significantly stronger activated brain regions of the old group during the cross-modal 
divided attention task (P< 0.05, corrected; k=10) 
cross-modal divided attention (old>young) 
Brain region 
    Talraich coordinates 
x y z z-value voxels 
R Fusiform Gyrus, BA 36/37  36 -52 -21 4.15 47 
R Parahippocampal Gyrus, BA 36  28 -32 -19 2.94  
L Lentiform Nucleus,Putamen -24 -11 12 3.90 30 
L Thalamus,Ventral Anterior Nucleus  -12 -4 4 2.65 
 
L Lentiform Nucleus,Lateral Globus Pallidus -20 0 0 2.52  
R Paracentral Lobule, BA 5  16 -32 53 3.76 12 
R Inferior Parietal Lobule, BA 40  49 -60 38 3.69 60 
L Fusiform Gyrus, BA 19/37 -55 -51 -18 3.66 31 
L Inferior Temporal Gyrus, BA 37  -55 -40 -18 2.82  
L Inferior Occipital Gyrus, BA 18  -40 -86 -6 2.64 
 
R Cingulate Gyrus, BA 24  8 9 25 3.50 17 
L Middle Temporal Gyrus, BA 39  -48 -61 29 3.42 98 
L Inferior parietal  lobule, BA 40 -44 -64 42 3.37  
L Superior Temporal Gyrus, BA 39 -59 -57 25 2.84 
 
L Precuneus, BA 19  -32 -68 37 2.52  
R Brainstem,Midbrain,Subthalamic Nucleus 12 -16 -3 3.43 20 
L Precentral Gyrus, BA 4  -44 -10 41 3.30 45 
R Inferior Frontal Gyrus, BA 46  48 28 13 3.26 13 
L Postcentral Gyrus, BA 7 -8 -51 65 3.06 10 
R Cingulate Gyrus, BA 24 8 -2 44 3.01 34 
L Cingulate Gyrus, BA 24 -4 -6 44 2.82  
R Precentral Gyrus, BA 4 40 -13 49 3.00 20 
R Uncus, BA 36 20 -5 -27 3.00 10 
L Middle Temporal Gyrus, BA 37  -48 -62 3 2.94 12 
L Claustrum -28 16 3 2.94 10 
R Precentral Gyrus, BA 6  40 1 29 2.92 14 
L Middle Frontal Gyrus, BA 9/10 -40 51 12 2.78 13 
 
TABLE 6. Significantly stronger activated brain regions of the young group during the cross-modal 
divided attention task (P< 0.05, corrected; k=10) 
cross-modal divided attention (young>old) 
Brain region 
    Talraich coordinates 
x y z z - v a l u e voxels 
R Thalamus 4 -11 19 4.35 69 
L  Caudate,Caudate Body  -12 -11 23 3.44  
R Thalamus,Pulvinar  12 -26 20 3.30  
R Hippocampus  32 -42 6 3.48 10 
R Superior Temporal Gyrus, BA 38 36 11 -21 3.33 15 
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TABLE 7. Brain regions identified to be significantly stronger activated in the old group 
considering the conjunction of the two within-modal tasks “auditory/auditory” and “visual/visual” 
(P< 0.05, corrected; k=10) 
within-modal divided attention (old>young) 
Brain region 
    Talraich coordinates 
x y z z - v a l u e voxels 
L  Precentral Gyrus, BA 6 -40 -9 45 3.25 28 
R Medial Frontal Gyrus, BA 6 4 -9 48 3.14 49 
R Inferior Parietal Lobule, BA 40  55 -45 39 2.82 16 
R Postcentral Gyrus, BA 7 12 -51 65 2.71 12 
R Superior Frontal Gyrus, BA 6 16 -12 67 2.68 22 
R Precentral Gyrus, BA 4/6 36 -20 60 2.44 
  
TABLE 8. Significantly stronger activated brain regions of the old group identified by the 
conjunction of the cross-modal divided attention task “auditory/visual” and the two within-modal 
divided attention tasks “auditory/auditory” and “visual/visual” (P< 0.05, corrected; k=10) 
Conjunction {cross-modal; within-modal divided attention} (old>young) 
Brain region 
    Talraich coordinates 
x y z z-value voxels 
L Precentral Gyrus, BA 4  -44 -10 41 2.94 20 
R Inferior Parietal Lobule, BA 40  51 -45 35 2.71 10 
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3.4 Discussion 
In the present study we aimed at distinguishing activation differences between young and 
old subjects performing within-modal (auditory/auditory; visual/visual) as well as cross-
modal (auditory/visual) divided attention tasks.  
First of all we would like to put emphasis on the fact that there were no significant 
behavioral differences between the two groups, which means that possible age-related 
shortcomings could be compensated by increased effort and as a result producing stronger 
activation in the responsible brain regions. In this context, the conjunction of all divided 
attention conditions, no matter if they were conducted within one sensory modality or 
across two different modalities, reveals that the older group presents with stronger left 
hemisphere motor activation, although several studies reported an age-related decline of 
the BOLD – contrast especially in the motor system (Hesselmann et al., 2001a; Ward, 
2006). Taking into account that the old group pressed the response button as often as the 
young group, we assume that the higher motor activation is modulated by additional 
attentional activation, e.g. in the right inferior parietal lobule which also shows stronger 
activation in the old group in again all three divided attention conditions. The right inferior 
parietal (BA 40) activation has been described as typical for divided attention conditions 
by authors dealing with only within-modal tasks (Koechlin et al., 1999; Nebel et al., 2005) 
as well as by studies analyzing cross-modal tasks (Johannsen et al., 1997; Szameitat et al., 
2002). Interestingly, in another study we showed  that this very activation, besides right 
hemisphere activation of the precentral gyrus, the superior frontal gyrus, the claustrum and 
the superior parietal lobule, displays typical divided attention activation irrespective of 
sensory modality respectively within or across-modality (Vohn et al., 2007).  
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If attention is divided within only one sensory (auditory or visual) modality the old group 
shows naturally still stronger activation in the right inferior parietal lobule accompanied 
by even more premotor and motor activation surprisingly affecting even the right 
hemisphere.  
In the cross-modal divided attention task however, the old cohort revealed a more wide-
spread network of additional activation. Besides stronger activation ascribed to motor, 
sensory and memory processes we found attention-relevant bilateral activation in inferior 
and middle frontal structures, in the cingulate gyrus and the inferior parietal lobule as well 
as in the left claustrum. The claustrum is considered to be involved especially in cross-
modal processing (Calvert, 2001; Ettlinger & Wilson, 1990; Hadjikhani & Roland, 1998). 
Crick and Koch (2005) see an analogy for the role of the claustrum as a conductor 
coordinating a group of players in an orchestra. As already mentioned we found the right 
claustrum to be involved in all divided attention tasks in an earlier study (Vohn et al., 
2007) and we assumed that this thin layer plays an important role in coordinating two 
tasks simultaneously irrespective if they are presented in the same or in two different 
sensory modalities, although the activation was stronger dealing with cross-modal tasks. 
The results of the present study suggest that also the left claustrum plays a fundamental 
role in coordinating two different sensory modalities and we assume that this increased 
activation in the old group is a compensatory effect reflecting the greater demand for top-
down control of attentional resources in order to cope with the demands of the tasks.  We 
propose the same explanation for the bilateral activation of the cingulate gyrus which is 
also known to be of high impact in attentional processing (Posner & Rothbart, 1998). 
While some authors claim that the cingulate gyrus is the most central part of an “executive 
attention” network (Fernandez-Duque et al., 2000; Fernandez-Duque & Posner, 2001), 
other authors (Banati et al., 2000; Laurienti et al., 2003) point out that this region is 
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especially involved in solving cross-modal requirements. In our former study we also 
showed that at least the right cingulate gyrus reveals stronger activation in a direct 
comparison of the cross- and within-modal divided attention tasks (Vohn et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, the additional fronto-parietal activations of the elder subjects group during 
the cross-modal task indicates the compensation of the greater demand for sensory 
coordination provoked by two ongoing auditory and visual cognitive processes. This is in 
accordance with the findings of the cross-modal divided attention study by Loose et al. 
(2003) and with our intermodal divided attention comparison study (Vohn et al., 2007). 
Despite the fact that other authors (Hesselmann et al., 2001; Ward, 2006) found evidence 
for younger subjects producing stronger BOLD-signal than old subjects, we did not find 
stronger activation in the younger group for most divided attention tasks in accordance 
with Madden et al. (1997). Only the cross-modal task revealed some stronger activation in 
the young group. Here, besides stronger activation in memory specific structures, we 
found thalamic participation. The thalamus is considered to operate as a gating system 
between the anterior cingulate, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the inferior parietal 
cortex and the brain stem part of the activating reticular system (Guillery et al., 1998; 
Steriade et al., 1986; Sturm et al., 1999; Stuss & Benson, 1986; Yingling & Skinner, 1975) 
in order to control the amount and direction of attentional activation from brain stem 
nuclei. Maybe the numerically faster reaction times of the younger group are represented 
in this additional activation of the gating system and might reflect a more bottom-up 
processing while dealing with the task like in the study by Madden et al. (1997).  
  
71 
 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
An age related analysis of divided attention tasks revealed that older subjects showed up 
with stronger attention-relevant bilateral activation in the inferior parietal lobule, the 
cingulate gyrus, the left claustrum as well as frontal activation in the left middle frontal 
and right inferior frontal gyrus especially in the cross-modal task. We assume that these 
differences in activation- reflect the higher demand for top-down control of attentional 
resources in elder subjects, especially for tasks presented in two different sensory 
modalities. A similar effect is also demonstrated for the within-modal tasks, where the 
elder subjects again show stronger activation in the right inferior parietal lobule, which 
has been shown to be strongly involved in divided attention tasks irrespective of sensory 
modality (Vohn et al., 2007). On the other hand the young subjects revealed additional 
thalamic activation, which could be explained by a more bottom-up processing for the 
younger age cohort, although this effect was only shown in the cross-modal task.  
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4.    Conclusions and further work 
The first fMRI-experiment revealed that the right prefrontal cortex, the right inferior and 
superior parietal cortex as well as the right claustrum represent the network which is 
responsible for the execution of divided attention tasks. These areas are activated 
irrespective of sensory modality and irrespective of whether the two ongoing tasks share 
the same sensory modality or not.  
An interesting finding of the study is that Wickens´ multiple resources model (1984) is not 
maintainable on the neural activity level and that the model (see Fig.1) .cannot serve as a 
brain model. According to Wickens, performing two tasks simultaneously in the same 
sensory modality should be more difficult than cross-modal dual tasks. In terms of Cave & 
Wolfe (1990), one might assume that simultaneous execution of two tasks which are 
presented in the same sensory modality should call for a higher top-down control than a 
cross-modal dual task. Thus, under the within-modal conditions a stronger frontal 
activation might be hypothesized than under the cross-modal condition. The results of the 
first experiment however, revealed exactly the opposite pattern. In this context, we assume 
that the supplementary bilateral frontal activation in the cross-modal task compared to the 
within-modal tasks reflects the greater demand for attentional coordination. The higher 
need for top-down processing in the cross-modal task is also reflected by the anterior 
cingulate cortex activation, which is known to play an important role in conscious control 
(Bartolomeo et al., 2007; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). Only in the cross-modal 
auditory/visual divided attention task there is additional activation in the left inferior 
parietal cortex. We hypothesize, that this supplementary activation as well as the generally 
more bilateral activation in the auditory/visual task might be an indication for the left 
hemisphere playing an additional role in integrating information from different sensory 
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qualities; while the administrable work for processing two tasks presented in just one 
modality can be solved by the described right-hemisphere network.  
This notion is corroborated by the results of the second fMRI-experiment where the old 
group showed stronger bilateral activation in the cross-modal condition in comparison to 
the young group. Interestingly, this contrast revealed also stronger activation of the left 
claustrum, which emphasizes the bilaterally important role of this structure in conducting 
the coordination of two different (especially cross-modal) tasks (Calvert, 2001; Ettlinger 
& Wilson, 1990; Hadjikhani & Roland, 1998; Crick & Koch, 2005).  
Besides the left claustrum, the older adults revealed also stronger cross-modal activation 
in the bilateral inferior parietal lobule, the bilateral anterior cingulate cortex as well as in 
the left middle frontal and right inferior frontal gyrus. Once again, the bilateral frontal and 
anterior cingulate cortex activation in the old group may be explained by the higher need 
for cognitive control and thus requiring more top-down control in a multi-sensory task 
compared to the young group. In the auditory as well as in the visual within-modal task 
comparison, the old group again revealed additional activation in the right inferior parietal 
cortex. The fact that nearly all relatively stronger activation of the old group was 
demonstrated in the first experiment to be highly relevant for processing divided attention 
tasks in general, leads us to the assumption that this is a compensatory effect. The older 
adults seem to up-regulate the “divided attention system” in order to cope with the tasks 
and thus counterbalancing age-related impairments.  
On the other hand, the additional thalamus activation of the young group in the cross-
modal task may be explained by a more bottom-up processing in comparison to the older 
adults. This assumption is emphasized by the numerically faster response times of the 
young group. 
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For further work it would be of great interest to see whether the activation networks 
change if both tasks are presented at the same time instead of in alternating order. Because 
a simultaneous presentation of two auditory tasks is not possible, a further paradigm 
should comprise only visual within-modal as well as an auditory/visual cross-modal task 
with their concomitant selective attention conditions. Hereby, the paradigm should lose its 
switching and rhythmic character and might delineate the structures responsible for both 
task switching and for dividing attention as compared to those relevant for just one 
domain. In this context, the conception of an event-related design in which the 
simultaneity of the presentation of the two tasks should be varied, might be helpful to 
distract different brain regions. Furthermore, in order to investigate the temporal relations 
of the neural activity it would be interesting to conduct an analysis of the time-series by 
dynamic causal modelling (DCM), a recent method for the interpretation of fMRI-data 
(Friston et al., 2003). 
Another new neuroimaging analysis technique is voxel based morphometry (VBM) which 
could also be of great interest for further investigations, especially of attentional aging 
effects. VBM detects focal differences in brain volume and would enable us to investigate 
whether the divided attention relevant brain regions have a comparable size across the two 
age cohorts. Recent VBM studies showed that intensive training of certain abilities lead to 
structural changes in the related brain regions (Maguire et al., 2000; May & Gaser, 2006). 
In this context, it would be of great interest to investigate the effect of training on the 
divided attention abilities and if this leads to an increase of brain volume in the relevant 
structures and finally, whether practice can eliminate aging effects. 
At last, it would be of great interest to examine the four different selective attention 
conditions of the first experiment in an age-related comparison, in order to examine 
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whether there is also stronger attention-related activation in the old group during the 
execution of the easier tasks of the selectivity aspect. 
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